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Abstract. Unbiased and objective architectural design decisions are
crucial for the success of a software development project. Stakeholder
inputs play an important role in arriving at such design decisions. How-
ever, the stakeholders may act in a biased manner in order to ensure that
their requirements and concerns are addressed in a specific way in the
software. Most of the existing methods of architectural decision-making
do not adequately account for such biased behavior of stakeholders.
We view the software architecture design as a collective decision making
(CDM) problem in social choice theory, and introduce the central ideas
of mechanism design to our field. Our contributions are twofold: i) Using
the impossibility results from social choice theory, we show that a ratio-
nal stakeholder can game, to her advantage, almost every known method
of software architecture decision making. ii) We also show that if the ar-
chitect is willing to bear the an extra cost of giving suitable incentives to
stakeholders, then architectural decision making can be protected from
strategic (biased) manipulations. For achieving this objective, we intro-
duce the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism from social choice
theory to the software architecture domain.
We illustrate our contributions by comparing and using the examples
drawn from the well-known CBAM method of architectural decision mak-
ing.
Keywords: Mechanism Design · Social Choice function · Multi-party
Strategic Games · Architectural design decisions · Human Factors in
Architecture · Economic Model
1 Introduction
“Architectures are created solely to meet stakeholder needs” - [14]
Designing architecture is one of the most decisive phases of the software devel-
opment life cycle. The architecture of a software relates the goals of stakeholders
to different aspects of the requirements and then the well-defined requirements
to the actual code of the project. This ensures traceability between the soft-
ware’s motivation, objectives, and the final product. The traceability is enabled
via software architecture and its related artifacts.
Architectural design decisions describe the rationale that led to the develop-
ment of software architecture. Such design decisions were earlier considered as
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one of the architectural artifacts[17]. However, in recent years a paradigm shift
in project development methodologies has made researchers and practitioners to
consider the architectural design decisions as software architecture itself [18].
Every architectural decision, and in turn the entire software architecture,
should be able to address the validated expectations of the stakeholders and
provide a practical solution for it. Therefore, arriving at the architectural deci-
sions is often considered difficult and is fraught with human biases. The human
bias can originate from the architect or from stakeholders or both [18] [16]. Also,
the existing techniques for arriving at software architecture decisions do not have
a formal mechanism to handle stakeholders input bias [8]. To avoid such human
bias and to choose an architecture that is fair to all stakeholders we propose a
fair model of selecting an architecture.
Various frameworks such as CBAM [4] (which is based on ATAM [6]), [7],
etc. have been developed for choosing the best candidate architecture from the
perspective of modern economic theory. However, a significant assumption taken
by these frameworks is the truthfulness of stakeholder inputs, even when it is
against the stakeholder’s personal benefit. This is in stark contrast to the well-
accepted assumption in modern microeconomics that all agents participating
in any economic activity are selfish and rational, and are only concerned with
their personal benefits [13]. Although CBAM-2 [11] highlights the stakeholder’s
tendency to manipulate the architectural decisions, it fails to offer a formal
mechanism to handle human bias. CBAM-2 merely provides a generic discussion-
based approach to handle such situations and they suggest to altogether replace
the voting based decision making.
Therefore, we address the following two questions in this paper:
Question-1. How do the “economic frameworks” for choosing a “most suited”
software architecture perform when faced with the possibility of selfish stakehold-
ers, who have the natural objective of influencing the decision processes to their
(personal or group) advantage?
Question-2. How can an organization set up incentives to ensure truthful
reporting and prevent collusion by various stakeholders while designing software
architecture?
To the best of our knowledge, the above questions have not been studied
adequately in the software architecture decision making literature. There exists
no mechanism which ensures that the stakeholders reveal their true concerns and
priorities, especially in relation or response to the other stakeholders’ inputs.
Using the tools of game theory and mechanism design developed in the field of
microeconomics, in this paper, we initiate the first systematic and detailed study
of these questions.
The rest of the paper is presented as follows. In §2 we present our objective
by explaining the concept of stakeholder rationality assumption and prove it
with the help of a well-known example. §3 explains the social choice theory in
the context of architectural design decisions. In order to address the Question-1
that we highlighted in the preceding paragraph, in §4 we give a rigorous proof of
our claim that all of the architectural design decisions are manipulable. Further,
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to address the Question-2, we present in §5 a non-manipulable algorithm that
ensures unbiased decisions during the architecture design. §6 discusses other
economic models and frameworks in software architecture domains, and finally,
§7 concludes our work and explains our future work.
2 Motivation and Objective
Different stakeholders in a software development project usually have different
concerns or goals. However, such concerns may overlap each other, or be con-
firming to each other, or even may conflict. Typically, the benefit of a particular
architectural decision to a stakeholder is expected to be aligned with the busi-
ness, technological or quality goals championed by that stakeholder.
Current methodologies for software architecture design inherently assume
that every stakeholder supplies to the architect an accurate picture of their inputs
and preferences among the various competing architectural designs. In practice,
this assumption is usually untenable [10] as it stipulates that each stakeholder
will be truthful about one’s inputs, even if it leads to their personal loss. In
reality, stakeholders are rational “players” and they are capable of influencing the
architectural decisions for their own benefits. Further, these “players”, instead
of manipulating the game alone, may also act in unison to have an even greater
effect on the architectural decisions. We show how such tactics may work in §2.2
by considering the example of a well-known architecture evaluation method.
Before that, we explain the rationality assumption.
2.1 The stakeholder rationality assumption
It is common knowledge and experience that each stakeholder acts rationally
and in her own best interest. An important consequence of such rational (or,
rather “selfish”) behavior of the stakeholder is that she may strategically report
an inaccurate or suitably modified picture of her true preferences. She may do it
to ensure that the overall architectural decisions are more favorable to her own
goals.
An even more unfortunate consequence of stakeholder rationality may be
collusion: a group of stakeholders decides together on reporting manipulated
preferences so that the architect can be induced to select a particular software
architecture design of their liking.
2.2 Effects of stakeholder rationality on CBAM method
We now illustrate the impact “stakeholder rationality assumption” can have on
the dynamics and outcome of a given architecture selection procedure. For this
purpose, we take an example with the well-known CBAM methodology [4] for
most suited architecture selection.
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CBAM in a nutshell (Adapted from [4])
1. Stakeholders report their benefits for every architecture strategy to the architect. We use r1, r2, . . . , rn
to denote the reported benefits. In particular, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ri(ASj) denotes the benefit reported
for architecture strategy ASj by stakeholder si. The benefits are in the range [−100, 100].
2. Costs of various architecture strategies are estimated. Let cj be the mean cost estimated for architecture
strategy ASj. Usually, there will also be an uncertainty interval around cj .
3. Desirability scores for architecture strategies are computed. The desirability score dj of ASj is equal
to average reported benefit divided by mean cost:
dj =
∑n
i=1 ri(ASj)
n · cj
4. Architecture strategies with high desirability scores are compared based on uncertainty in their costs
and benefits.
5. One or more architecture strategies with high desirability score and low uncertainty are selected.
Note: The above outline of the CBAM method is sufficient for the purposes of this paper. However, we
would like to note that there is a detailed process attached to each of the above basic steps.
For ease of understanding, we have used the same terminology as used in CBAM
for describing the following example. Suppose we have a scenario where the archi-
tect must choose an architecture for software such that certain quality attributes
(QAs) are satisfied to the desired level. Further, suppose that a method such as
CBAM is used to help in making such a selection. To keep the scenario simple,
let’s say there is only one QA under consideration: battery lifetime, and assume
that there are only three architecture strategies AS1, AS2, and AS3 affecting
this QA, and three stakeholders s1, s2, and s3 in the decision-making process.
The architect has decided to employ CBAM methodology and will be selecting
exactly one architecture strategy out of AS1, AS2, and AS3.
As per CBAM methodology, the architect first asks each stakeholder to re-
port the contribution scores between −1 and 1 for each candidate architecture
strategy. The benefits of a candidate architecture strategy for a particular stake-
holder is obtained by multiplying contribution score by 100. Suppose the actual
benefits derived are as given in Table-1.
The average benefit for each architecture strategy is also depicted in Table-1.
The last two rows of this table contain the cost of each architecture strategy, as
well as its desirability score as per CBAM methodology.
From the data shown in Table-1, one can, therefore, conclude that, if all
stakeholders had reported their true and correct benefit values to the architect,
AS3 would have been selected as per the CBAM method. This is because the
strategy AS3 has the highest desirability. This can be pictorially seen from Fig-
1, where cost is on X-axis, the benefit is on Y -axis, and cost-benefit evaluation
of each stakeholder for each architecture strategy is represented by a point.
Now, let us change the scenario to selfish stakeholders, each working towards
their own advantage. Suppose stakeholder s1 somehow gets to know that her first
preference AS1 will never get selected, as it is scored very low by the remaining
stakeholders. Suppose the next best outcome for s1 is the selection of AS2, since
she prefers it over AS3. However, the CBAM method with truthful reporting
will select her least preferred alternative AS3.
To tip the decision process in favour of AS2 over AS3, s1 will strategize by
falsely reporting a much higher benefit for AS2 and a much lower benefit for AS3.
Suppose s1 reports the benefit of AS1 at its actual value 30, but falsely reports
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Strategy
AS1
Strategy
AS2
Strategy
AS3
Actual Benefits of stakeholder, s1 80 70 65
Actual Benefits of stakeholder, s2 -90 50 60
Actual Benefits of stakeholder, s3 -50 50 62
Average Actual Benefit, B -20 56.67 62.33
Anticipated Cost, C 80 95 90
Desirability = B ÷ C -0.25 0.6 0.69
Table 1: CBAM based on actual stakeholder benefits for architecture strategies
a higher benefit of 50 for AS2 (we are assuming that s1 is very lucky in choice of
her false values) and a lower benefit of −10 for AS3. Further, suppose that the
stakeholders s2 and s3 chose to give non-manipulated inputs. The outcome of
CBAM method is now given in Table-2. This situation is pictorially represented
in Fig-2.
Clearly, architecture strategy AS2 will be selected instead of AS3 now, as it
has the maximum desirability score as well as due to the fact that the uncertainty
in the desirability score is zero (all three stakeholders report the same value of 50
for benefit from strategy AS2). Thus, by strategically misreporting her benefits
based on available information about stakeholder choices, stakeholder s1 was
able to ensure AS2 gets selected instead of AS3. Since she prefers AS2 more
than AS3, she has been able to influence the CBAM method in favor of her
preferences.
To summarize, in the event of truthful reporting, AS3 would have been the
option with maximum desirability score and minimum risk or uncertainty. How-
ever, strategically biased reporting by stakeholder s1, leads to AS2 taking the
place of AS3 as a preferred option in terms of costs, benefits, and uncertainty.
We would like to note that the dynamics of CBAM method will be much more
complicated when all stakeholders have access to various amounts of insider
information about judgments of other stakeholders, and hence will misreport
their benefits, by strategizing based on available information, either in groups
or individually.
Given the existing gap in the architectural design decision-making process,
we propose a decision-making method using social choice theory. Our approach
can be used to find the optimal architecture in a given scenario. We propose
an objective voting based mechanism which can avoid manipulation of the ar-
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chitecture selection process. We believe that a discussion-based method for the
purpose is often very time consuming and subjective. Also, discussions are diffi-
cult to converge in complex scenarios.
3 Software architecture design in the context of social
choice theory
The main thesis of this paper is that the software architecture design process
can be naturally modeled as a collective decision making (CDM) problem in
social choice theory. In a social choice theory framework, a CDM problem can
be described as follows.
We have a set S′ = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} of n participants and a finite set X ′ =
{x1, x2, . . . , xm} of m alternatives or outcomes. Each participant pi has a par-
ticular preference order or valuation function vi : X
′ → R over the set X ′ of all
alternatives. The objective is to collate all individual preferences or valuations
to arrive at a common preference or valuation over the set of all alternatives.
Further, the choice of a common preference or valuation over the alternative set
X ′ must be appropriate from the perspective of overall “social welfare”.
We now compare the above situation with a typical software architecture
design process. An architect has to design a particular software architecture
which rationally collates the viewpoints and preferences of various stakeholders
involved with the software in varying capacities. Examples of stakeholders are
acquirers, developers, maintainers, testers, end users, etc. [14].
3.1 CDM modeling
The mapping to social choice theory is as follows:
1. The set of possible software architectures (or architecture strategies) form
the set X = {a1, a2, . . . , am} of alternatives.
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Strategy AS1 Strategy AS2 Strategy AS3
Reported Benefits of stakeholder, s1 80 50 -10
Reported Benefits of stakeholder, s2 -90 50 60
Reported Benefits of stakeholder, s3 -50 50 62
Average Reported Benefit, B -20 50 37.33
Anticipated Cost, C 80 95 90
Desirability = B ÷ C -0.25 0.53 0.41
Table 2: CBAM based on reported stakeholder benefits for architecture strate-
gies. Wherever the reported values are different from actual values, they have
been shown in bold font.
2. The set of different stakeholders form the set S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} of partici-
pants.
3. Each stakeholder si has some benefit (utility) ui(x) ∈ R for every candi-
date architectural strategy x ∈ X. Alternatively, in case of preferences, each
stakeholder si has a linear ordering oi of the set X. If x occurs before x
′
in ordering oi, it means that stakeholder si prefers architecture strategy x
′
over x.
4. The goal of the software architect is to choose an architecture strategy x∗ ∈
X which maximizes a suitable notion of social welfare i.e., an architecture
which rationally collates the various preferences received by the architect
from the stakeholders.
4 Impossibility of designing a non-manipulable software
architecture selection method for selfish stakeholders
In §2.2, we illustrated by means of an example that the outcome of the well-
known CBAM method for software architecture selection can be manipulated
by selfish stakeholder(s) in their favor. In light of this example, we now consider
the following natural question:
Is there a software architecture selection method which cannot be strategically
manipulated by selfish stakeholder(s) in their favor?
In this section, we answer the above question in the negative i.e., we show
that every stakeholder-input based software architecture selection method can be
gamed. This has two consequences:
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1. There does not exist any CBAM-like method which is non-manipulable, i.e.,
a method which is immune to stakeholder manipulation as described in 2.2.
2. The existence of the example discussed in §2.2 is not particular to the CBAM
method; similar examples can be constructed for any other software architec-
ture selection method which selects an optimal architecture based on stake-
holders’ inputs.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. We start by providing some
definitions and setting up relevant notation. In §4.1, we provide an abstract
definition of a software architecture selection method, and we also give a rigorous
definition of a non-manipulable software architecture selection method. (Such
methods are called dominant strategy incentive-compatible in social choice theory
literature [13][3][10].)
Finally, in §4.2, we show that no non-trivial non-manipulable software archi-
tecture selection method exists.
4.1 Definitions
Definition 1. Software architecture selection method. A software archi-
tecture selection method M with stakeholder inputs consists of the following se-
quence of steps:
1. The architect requests each stakeholder si to provide her actual benefit
ui : X → R.
2. Reported benefit by each stakeholder is ri : X → R. ri takes into consid-
eration the fact that a selfish stakeholder may misreport the actual or true
benefit.
3. By applying her decision algorithm A with the reported benefits {ri | 1 ≤ i ≤
n} as input, the architect selects a single architecture ai∗ from the set X of
candidate architectures.
The key difference among the various software architecture selection methods
lies in the design of the algorithm A. For a CDM based on social choice theory,
the algorithm A is called the social choice function [13,3].
Definition 2. Non-manipulable software architecture selection. A soft-
ware architecture selection method M is called non-manipulable if and only if it
is in the best interest of each stakeholder to report her true benefit to the architect
i.e., for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and for all possible reported benefit functions r1, r2, . . . , rn,
we have that:
ui(A(r1, r2, . . . , ui, . . . , rn)) ≥ ui(A(r1, r2, . . . , ri, . . . , rn))
Note that the above condition ensures truthfulness on the part of each ratio-
nal stakeholder, irrespective of her awareness about the strategies as well as the
actions of other stakeholders.
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4.2 Non-existence of a non-manipulable software architecture
selection method
The non-existence of non-manipulable software architecture selection methods
follows from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [13][3] in social choice theory.
For the scenario of software architecture selection, we adapt and state the theo-
rem as follows:
Theorem 1. Suppose there are at least three different candidate architectures
in set X. Further, suppose the social choice algorithm A used by the architect is
non-manipulable.
Then A is a dictatorship, i.e., there exists an index i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such
that the architect always chooses an architecture which maximizes the reported
benefit of stakeholder si and completely ignores the reported benefits provided by
the remaining stakeholders sj , j 6= i.
We now illustrate Theorem 1 with two examples.
Example 1. Dictatorial CBAM. Consider a dictatorial version of CBAM,
where the architect takes the benefit reported by stakeholder s2 as the average
reported benefit, and then selects the architecture with maximum desirability.
Thus, the benefits reported by s1 and s3 are discarded by the architect and not
used in the decision-making process.
In this selection method, there is no incentive for s1 and s3 to misreport
their benefits, as they are anyway not part of the decision process. Thus, this
method cannot be manipulated by s1 and s3. However, s2 can still manipulate
the method’s outcome, as shown by Table-3. If s2 had reported her true benefit
values, strategy AS1 with the desirability of 1.25 would have been selected. (This
is because, though s2 has more benefit from AS2 than AS1, the cost of AS1 is
much lower than that of AS2.) However, s2 prefers AS2 more than AS1, and
hence by misreporting a higher benefit of 100 for AS2 and a lower benefit of
30 for AS1, she ensures that AS2 has the highest desirability and gets selected
instead of AS1.
Example 2. Plain Dictatorship. Now consider the same example as above,
with the following change in selection algorithm A. The benefits reported by s1
and s3 are discarded. However, now the architecture selected is the one with the
maximum reported benefit for s2.
Clearly, s1 and s3 have no incentive to misreport, as their feedback does not
count. But now, s2 also has no incentive to misreport her benefit values, as the
strategy with maximum reported benefit value for s2 always gets selected. Thus,
this method is non-manipulable.
Thus, Theorem 1 puts serious limitations on CDM and shows that only soft-
ware architecture selection methods similar to those in Example 2 above are
non-manipulable. Any deviation from plain dictatorship (such as for example
1 above, or the example in §2.2), leads to scenarios where stakeholder(s) can
unfairly influence the outcome in their favor.
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Strategy AS1 Strategy AS2 Strategy AS3
Actual Benefits of stakeholder, s2 50 80 -10
Reported Benefits of stakeholder, s2 30 100 -10
Anticipated Cost, C 40 100 50
Actual Desirability = Average Actual
Benefit ÷ C 1.25 0.8 -0.2
Calculated Desirability = Average Re-
ported Benefit ÷ C 0.75 1 -0.2
Table 3: Manipulating dictatorial CBAM where the benefits reported by s2 are
taken as average actual benefits
5 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for software
architecture selection
We now propose a novel non-manipulable software architecture selection method
M, using the well-known VCG mechanism [13],[3],[10]. The non-manipulability
of the proposed approach is ensured by making payments to individual stake-
holders; the payments are devised in such a way that a selfish stakeholder will
always report her true benefit values.
Figure-3 depicts the proposed non-manipulable approach to selecting archi-
tecture using VCG. The numbers on the arrows in the figure depict the sequence
of actions for selection. Our approach will always select the architecture with a
maximum total reported benefit. Here, ui : X → R,∀i ∈ [1, n], denotes the
actual benefits and ri : X → R denotes the reported benefits of stakeholder si.
The VCG module depicted in Figure-3 is discussed in Algorithm 1. For our
algorithm (Algorithm 1) we use Clarke pivot rule 1 with VCG.
As shown in Figure-3, after the VCG module is executed, the architect in-
forms the stakeholders about the selected candidate architecture VCG(r1, r2, . . . , rn)
and further distributes net incentives equivalent to pVCGi (r1, r2, . . . , rn) to each
stakeholder si. Each stakeholder derives benefits due to two reasons: (i) an actual
benefit of ui(VCG(r1, r2, . . . , rn)) due to the selection of the particular architec-
1 Note that the payment calculation formula consists of two terms: the first term
T+i (r1, r2, . . . , rn) depends on the benefits reported by stakeholder si; however, the
second term T−i (r1, r2, . . . , rn) is due to Clarke pivot rule. This second term is in-
dependent of the benefits ri reported by stakeholder si. All payments in Clarke
pivot rule are negative or zero. Hence, the architect can correspondingly decide the
incentives. The reader is referred to [13], [3] for further details on Clarke pivot rule.
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Fig. 3: Overview of our non-manipulable architecture selection technique M
ture by VCG module, and (ii) incentives to the value of pVCGi (r1, r2, . . . , rn) from
the architect. Thus, the net benefit NBVCGi (r1, r2, . . . , rn) of stakeholder si under
VCG mechanism is equal to ui(ak∗) + pVCGi (r1, r2, . . . , rn). As the stakeholder is
rational, her objective is now to maximize her net benefit. Thus, the following
social choice theory theorem (Theorem-2), which is stated from [13][3], applies
in this context.
Theorem 2. If the objective of each selfish stakeholder is to maximize her net
benefit, then VCG is non-manipulable.
Here, the “net benefit” represents the stakeholder benefit after incorporating
her incentive payments. Throughout this paper, we have used the term “benefits”
to indicate just the direct benefits expected by a stakeholder when a specific
architecture alternative gets selected.
It is pertinent here to note that if we replace “net benefit” with “benefit” in
Theorem 2, then the mechanism becomes manipulable.
5.1 Examples of software architecture selection using VCG
algorithm
We now illustrate the outcome of architecture selection by VCG on the examples
considered earlier in this paper.
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Algorithm 1: Steps of VCG module for software architecture selec-
tion
Input: 1) Reported benefits: (r1, r2, . . . , rn)
2) X: Set of candidate architectures
Output: Selected architecture VCG(r1, r2, . . . , rn) and payments
pVCGi (r1, r2, . . . , rn) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Calculate the total reported benefit TRBk(r1, r2, . . . , rn) =
∑n
i=1 ri(ak) for each1
candidate architecture ak.
Let ak∗ be the candidate architecture with the maximum TRBk(r1, r2, . . . , rn).2
If there are more than one such architectures, choose one of them arbitrarily.
For each stakeholder si, calculate:3
T+i (r1, r2, . . . , rn) =
∑
j 6=i
rj(ak∗)
T−i (r1, r2, . . . , rn) = maxk∈[1,m]
(∑
j 6=i
rj(ak)
)
Calculate payment pVCGi (r1, r2, . . . , rn) = T
+
i (r1, r2, . . . , rn)− T−i (r1, r2, . . . , rn)4
to stakeholder si.
Set VCG(r1, r2, . . . , rn) = ak∗ .5
CBAM Example from §2.2. We now implement VCG mechanism on the
CBAM example given in §2.2.
Let u1, u2, and u3 be the actual benefits of stakeholders s1, s2, and s3 (see first
three rows of Table-1). Further, let r1, r2, and r3 denote the reported benefits of
stakeholders s1, s2, and s3 (see first three rows of Table-2). Table-4 describes the
computation of payments pVCGi (r1, r2, r3) and net benefits NB
VCG
i (r1, r2, r3).
Now, suppose stakeholder s1 unilaterally decides to report her true benefit
values. Thus, the reported benefits are u1, r2, and r3. The outcome of VCG
mechanism is summarized in Table-5.
Thus, if stakeholder s1 reports her benefit values truthfully to mechanism
VCG, and the other stakeholders do not change their benefit values, the net
benefit of s1 increases from 28 to 65. Hence, if the architect had implemented
an algorithm VCG, it would have been in the best interest of s1 not to misreport
her benefit values. Since VCG algorithm will ensure that each stakeholder speaks
the truth, the architecture strategy AS3 will be selected by it since it has the
maximum total reported (which would now be actual) benefit.
Note that in this particular example, the architecture strategy selected by
VCG is the same as that selected by CBAM. However, this is not always the
case.
Dictatorial CBAM example from §4.2. Now consider the dictatorial CBAM
method of §4.2. Further, suppose that the actual benefits u2 and reported benefit
r2 of stakeholder s2 are those given in first two rows of Table-3. To complete the
input specification, we assume that the actual benefit vectors of s1 and s3 are
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i
s1
(i = 1)
s2
(i = 2)
s3
(i = 3)
T+i (r1, r2, r3) 100 100 100
T−i (r1, r2, r3) 122 100 100
pVCGi (r1, r2, r3) -22 0 0
ui(VCG(r1, r2, r3)) 50 50 50
NBVCGi (r1, r2, r3) 28 50 50
Table 4: Computation of payments and
net benefits as per VCG mechanism,
based on reported benefits r1, r2, and
r3.
i
s1
(i = 1)
s2
(i = 2)
s3
(i = 3)
T+i (u1, r2, r3) 122 127 125
T−i (u1, r2, r3) 122 127 125
pVCGi (u1, r2, r3) 0 0 0
ui(VCG(u1, r2, r3)) 65 60 62
NBVCGi (u1, r2, r3) 65 60 62
Table 5: Computation of payments and
net benefits as per VCG mechanism,
based on reported benefits u1, r2, and
r3.
u1 = (55, 60, 10) and u3 = ( 40, 50, − 20) respectively. Table-6 describes the
actual run of VCG for reported benefits u1, r2, and u3.
Now suppose stakeholder s2 had instead reported her true benefit values
u2 = (50, 80,−10). Table-7 describes a run of algorithm VCG with reported
benefits u1, u2, and u3. Since speaking the truth keeps the net benefit of s2 the
same, there is no incentive for her to lie under mechanism VCG. Further, since
all stakeholders are constrained to report true benefits, VCG(u1, u2, u3) is AS2,
and this outcome is non-manipulable.
5.2 Discussion
Why a utilitarian objective function? In algorithm VCG above, the archi-
tect always picks the architecture with maximum total reported benefit. The
sum of all stakeholder benefits for a given architecture is called the utilitarian
objective function. A natural question is whether VCG-type mechanisms can be
devised which select an architecture based on objective functions other than the
utilitarian objective function while ensuring truthfulness by rational stakehold-
ers.
i
s1
(i = 1)
s2
(i = 2)
s3
(i = 3)
T+i (u1, r2, u3) 150 110 160
T−i (u1, r2, u3) 150 110 160
pVCGi (u1, r2, u3) 0 0 0
ui(VCG(u1, r2, u3)) 60 80 50
NBVCGi (u1, r2, u3) 60 80 50
Table 6: Computation of payments and
net benefits as per VCG mechanism,
based on reported benefits u1, r2, and
u3.
i
s1
(i = 1)
s2
(i = 2)
s3
(i = 3)
T+i (u1, u2, u3) 130 110 140
T−i (u1, u2, u3) 130 110 140
pVCGi (u1, u2, u3) 0 0 0
ui(VCG(u1, u2, u3)) 60 80 50
NBVCGi (u1, u2, u3) 60 80 50
Table 7: Computation of payments and
net benefits as per VCG mechanism,
based on reported benefits u1, u2, and
u3.
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There is considerable literature in social choice theory and mechanism design
on how to deal with this question. A theorem due to Roberts ([13]), proves that if
there is no restriction on the possible benefit functions, then the only possible so-
cial choice functions for which the above VCG-type decision algorithm can force
stakeholder truthfulness are weighted utilitarian functions. Essentially, these are
social choice functions which always choose an architecture which maximizes the
weighted sum of reported benefits of a particular subset of stakeholders. In light
of these observations, the objective function chosen is utilitarian.
How can the architect incentivize the decision process? Usually, the
form of incentives are specific to an organization and its culture. For example,
when all stakeholders are members of a single organization, the payments to be
derived from the various stakeholders by algorithm VCG can be implemented by
the administrators using absence or presence of certain organizational incentives
such as higher salary, bonus, or shares, elevation or promotion, commendations,
extra fund allocation, etc.
In a situation where some or all aspects of software development are being
carried out by outside organizational entities (third party), the use of algorithm
VCG by the architect will encourage truthfulness on part of various competing
entities and lead to maximization of total benefits. The payments relative to
outside entities stipulated by algorithm VCG can then be implemented using
certain profitable contract clauses, long-term service contracts, recommendation
for future projects, etc.
6 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no decision-making technique in soft-
ware architecture which uses mechanism design or social choice theory. Hence,
we consider those methodologies related to our work which takes stakeholders’
concerns as input along with requirements and other environmental constraints.
In methods like CBAM [4], [1] and [5] the authors made the customer decide
which stakeholder to be included in the decision-making process, and then these
stakeholders give some numeric number or score to the quality attributes, where
these number should sum to 100. They made the stakeholder describe why or
how a particular quality is essential. To choose between the various architectural
strategy they calculate a desirability factor which decreases with cost. CBAM
paper lists three important criteria to arrive at an architectural decision: costs,
benefits, and uncertainty or risks. All data gathered and used during an architec-
ture decision process is at best only an estimate, and therefore is best represented
by associated probability distributions, rather than exact, definite values. The
CBAM framework measures the relevance of a candidate architecture by the
ratio of benefits to costs.
In [7] the architects in collaborations with project stakeholders define the cost
and benefit functions. Each alternative has a utility score defined as the weighted
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sum of the stakeholders’ preferences for each goal. Hence they measure the rele-
vance of a candidate architecture by the “net benefit,” i.e., quantity obtained by
subtracting the costs from the benefits. CEDA [12] considers stakeholder’s con-
cerns to develop shared understanding aligned towards an organization’s goals.
Tools like RADAR [2] use CBAM or ATAM as the starting point of developing
an architecture and then handle particular aspects of architecture design decision
like uncertainty using a Pareto optimal approach. Techniques like REARM[9] ac-
cept quantifiable input from stakeholders, but do not provide the details of how
is to be done. Further, techniques like [8] integrate updated versions of CBAM-2
to handle structured analysis of architecture in agile development. [15] suggests
a workshop based approach to handle concerns of stakeholders and specifically
mentions as automating the handling of concerns and conflict as the need of the
hour.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
Software architecture comprises of a set of decisions that need to be taken timely
and correctly to avoid project failures. Reaching these decisions involves han-
dling of the requirement of various stakeholders, who may (rightfully) push for
their concerns to be realized in a certain way in software architecture. In soft-
ware architecture research mostly this human aspect of architectural decisions
is ignored.
We provide a new paradigm in software architecture decision-making by ob-
jectively handling human biases such as personal benefits, habits, strategically
biased inputs, and so on. We identify the presence of rational stakeholders in
the architectural decision-making process and propose the usage of social choice
theory and mechanism design to handle their concerns. We provide a rigorous
framework to ensure truthful information elicitation from rational stakeholders,
thus ensuring that human factors do not influence software architecture design.
We are working on developing a tool, based on our proposed and validated
VCG methodology to assist the architect in eliciting truthful information from
stakeholders and thus make unbiased decisions while designing software archi-
tecture. This tool would be used by an architect to resolve the conflicts and
concerns of stakeholders and automate the process of fair selection of architec-
tural strategies.
References
1. Asundi, J., Kazman, R., Klein, M.: Using economic considerations to choose among
architecture design alternatives. Tech. rep., CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIV PITTS-
BURGH PA SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INST (2001)
2. Busari, S.A., Letier, E.: Radar: A lightweight tool for requirements and architecture
decision analysis. In: Proceedings of the 39th International Conference on Software
Engineering. pp. 552–562. IEEE Press (2017)
3. Garg, D., Narahari, Y., Gujar, S.: Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial
part 1-key concepts and classical results. Sadhana 33(2), 83 (2008)
16 S. Sharma et al.
4. Kazman, R., Asundi, J., Klein, M.: Quantifying the costs and benefits of architec-
tural decisions. In: Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Software
Engineering. ICSE 2001. pp. 297–306. IEEE (2001)
5. Kazman, R., Asundi, J., Klien, M.: Making architecture design decisions: An eco-
nomic approach. Tech. rep., CARNEGIE-MELLON UNIV PITTSBURGH PA
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INST (2002)
6. Kazman, R., Barbacci, M., Klein, M., Carrie`re, S.J., Woods, S.G.: Experience with
performing architecture tradeoff analysis. In: Proceedings of the 1999 International
Conference on Software Engineering (IEEE Cat. No. 99CB37002). pp. 54–63. IEEE
(1999)
7. Letier, E., Stefan, D., Barr, E.T.: Uncertainty, risk, and information value in soft-
ware requirements and architecture. In: Proceedings of the 36th International Con-
ference on Software Engineering. pp. 883–894. ACM (2014)
8. Lopes, S.V.F., Junior, P.T.A.: Architectural design group decision-making in agile
projects. In: 2017 IEEE International Conference on Software Architecture Work-
shops (ICSAW). pp. 210–215. IEEE (2017)
9. Mart´ınez-Ferna´ndez, S., Ayala, C.P., Franch, X., Marques, H.M.: Rearm: A reuse-
based economic model for software reference architectures. In: International Con-
ference on Software Reuse. pp. 97–112. Springer (2013)
10. Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M.D., Green, J.R., et al.: Microeconomic theory, vol. 1.
Oxford university press New York (1995)
11. Moore, M., Kaman, R., Klein, M., Asundi, J.: Quantifying the value of architec-
ture design decisions: lessons from the field. In: 25th International Conference on
Software Engineering, 2003. Proceedings. pp. 557–562. IEEE (2003)
12. Nakakawa, A., Bommel, P.v., Proper, H.: Requirements for collaborative decision
making in enterprise architecture (2009)
13. Nisan, N., Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E., Vazirani, V.V.: Algorithmic Game Theory.
Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA (2007)
14. Rozanski, N., Woods, E.: Software systems architecture: working with stakeholders
using viewpoints and perspectives. Addison-Wesley (2011)
15. Schenkhuizen, J., van der Werf, J.M.E., Jansen, S., Caljouw, L.: Consistent in-
consistency management: a concern-driven approach. In: European Conference on
Software Architecture. pp. 201–209. Springer (2016)
16. Tang, A., Razavian, M., Paech, B., Hesse, T.M.: Human aspects in software archi-
tecture decision making: a literature review. In: 2017 IEEE International Confer-
ence on Software Architecture (ICSA). pp. 107–116. IEEE (2017)
17. van der Ven, J.S., Jansen, A.G., Nijhuis, J.A., Bosch, J.: Design decisions: The
bridge between rationale and architecture. In: Rationale management in software
engineering, pp. 329–348. Springer (2006)
18. van Vliet, H., Tang, A.: Decision making in software architecture. Journal of Sys-
tems and Software 117, 638–644 (2016)
